Maximum parent vs. SNS parliamentary caucus vs. foreign structure for (also) tax optimization.

At first glance, completely unrelated topics. At a fourth glance, however, you will find one common denominator in their metadata.

📌 Abuse of Law Institute.

It says 4.2.2025 and dad – entrepreneur wants to go on maternity leave. He wants to have it maximum, and therefore:

➡️ as of 4.2. he sets the remuneration of the managing director at EUR 1 per month;
➡️ on 31.8. he cancels the remuneration of the managing director;
➡️ on 1.9. he is employed in another company with a salary of EUR 2 850/month;
➡️ on 1.11. he reduces it to EUR 100/month;
➡️ takes maternity leave on 30.11.

Numerically, it works out like this:

➡️ for the period 4.2. – 30.11. his super gross salary is about EUR 7 900;
➡️ for the period 4.2. – 30.11., his net salary is approximately EUR 4 250;
➡️ “It will therefore send EUR 7 900 – EUR 4 250 = EUR 3 650 to the ‘State’;
➡️ However, the €7,900 is a “tax shield”, so Dad’s company saves about €2,100 at the 21% rate and the 7% dividend tax, so he effectively pays only €3,650 – €2,100 = €1,550 to the “state”;
➡️ for 28 weeks of maternity leave, dad will get about 13 800 EUR + 420 EUR mom will get one extra parental allowance (that’s why the start date is exactly 30.11);
➡️ net, the family will be + approx. 12 700 EUR.

Everything is “for show”, including taking custody of the child…. And Social Security (the state) tacitly condones it – maybe that’s why it has such a deficit…

✅ What will the dad – employee, who has a gross salary of EUR 2 000 and who will pay about EUR 7 000 to the social insurance company during those 10 months (dad – entrepreneur only about EUR 2 000), but his maternity allowance is to be about 30% lower, say about this?

This basic injustice has its reasons in:

👉 the growing trend in Slovakia to interpret the rule of law reductively (“Problem 1”);
👉 the incompetence of the legislator to react to economic changes (nowadays, even in the USS Košice, tradesmen are pinching in and out) and to adapt the rules of the game to the economic reality (“Problem 2”); while the Social Insurance Act (2003) is a piece of quality technical work in its foundation, and thus it is (could be) something to build on.

I will write more about Problem 1, and how it relates to the SNS parliamentary club and foreign structures (and also tax optimization) in my next Linkedin block (below). 📌

Problem 2 in the broader context summarised by Robert Chovanculiak: “A dysfunctional cadastre, empty warehouses of material reserves after a pandemic outbreak,… It says something about the competence capacity of the state. And in particular, how likely it is to be able to come up with solutions in the case of complex and difficult reforms.” In the context of the recent tax changes, this is perhaps best summed up specifically by our legislator who:
👉 has trouble writing an error-free definition of taxpayer in the FTT Act, while at the same time
👉 has no problem taxing an SRO with revenues of EUR 100,000 at 10% (and, paradoxically, fighting the shvarc system) and taxing the one with EUR 100,001 revenues at the full 21%.

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